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I. Introduction 
The concept of personhood is a fundamental category related to critical 
medical decisions. Experts are unanimously in agreement concerning its 
axiological value in regard to bioethical issues. Therefore, there is a 
requirement for a precise understanding of its foundation in a biomedical 
context. I•S For example, dementia, "vegetative" states, severe 
encephalopathies, etc, are complex medical conditions that lead to a deep 
reflection about the very essence of human life. It goes beyond neurology 
to the fields of philosophy, theology, bioethics and other disciplines. 
The approach to this issue requires a dialogue that proceeds 
methodologically by following two steps I: first, it needs to start out from 
the phenomenon presented to the field of biomedicine, describing it as 
precisely and clearly as possible; secondly, it needs to elaborate and ponder 
all the questions that trespass the limits of this field and require an 
interdisciplinary approach. It is particularly important to avoid 
imprecision in the first stage of this process. Neurology occupies a 
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privileged position in the dialogue with other sciences. This is particularly 
so concerning the problem of personhood, which is one of the more central 
issues in the interface between medicine and theology. 
This article will briefly review a philosophical and theological 
tradition in western civilization, which elaborated, with great lucidity, a 
unitary concept of the human person. Afterwards, the essential biomedical 
facts, which provide a well-defined support to this anthropological view, 
will be considered. The confluence of these aspects will delineate an 
integrating rationale based on what, in the author' s view, constitutes the 
neurological core of personhood. 1-5 Remarkably, these different sources of 
knowledge can be finely articulated to shed new light on this central issue. 
This provides a new theoretical frame to elaborate a number of 
fundamental philosophical and ethical problems. 
II. Historical Perspective 
The word "soul" has had many different meanings throughout the 
history of our civilization. Spirit, breath, vital force, life, creature, reason, 
intellect, thought, will , the moral or emotional nature, the totality of the 
personal being, are among the attributes related to this word.6 The study of 
its significance leads to terms which are in the origins of our western 
culture: basar, nefesh, ruah and feb (these terms have been translated into 
the Greek as follows: sarx, psuche, pneuma, kardia, and into Latin as 
follows : caro, anima, spiritus, cor or mens). 7-9 We will come back to these 
terms later on. 
A long pre-Aristotelian tradition located the soul between the thorax 
and the abdomen, in the diaphragm muscle. The liver, the heart, and finally 
the brain were considered at different times and cultures as the bodily 
habitat of the soul.6 In Homer and in the pre-Aristotelian materialist 
tradition, the soul was considered as a breath or wrapping of the body, a 
kind of force, vapor, specter or ghost, a more subtle material essence. The 
air, the fire, or the atoms of the soul were variously considered as the 
essential elements by thinkers in this line of thought. According to 
PopperlO even these materialists sustained a dualism in which the soul or 
the mind were considered as the essence of the body. In fact, there were 
two different notions about this essence, one related to the body and the 
other an incorporeal one. This later was developed by Pythagoras and the 
Pythagoreans. They considered the essence of things as an abstract reality, 
a number or a harmony. 
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The Brain as the rector of the body 
The idea of the brain as the "locus" of the soul runs through the 
centuries, and the most various locations inside this organ were considered 
as the seat of the soul not only by philosophers but also by anatomists. 
Notably, the Hippocratic medical treatise "About the Sacred Infirmity" 
emphatically affirms that the brain "tells the limbs how to act" and also that 
the brain "is the messenger of consciousness telling it what occurs.,,11 It is 
also described as the interpreter of consciousness. 
Plato 
Plato conceived the soul in the realm of forms or ideas. 12 His concept 
of the mind includes three aspects: reason, appetites and energy. The body 
as the prison of the soul, the counter-position between body and matter, 
characterizes both his anthropology and his cosmology. The relation 
between body and soul is understood in antagonistic, almost hostile terms. 
Plato's simile of the soul as the pilot of the body ~oes not have a biological 
connotation, as it does in the Aristotelian concept of the soul, which will be 
analyzed later on. Death leads to liberation of what is immaterial and 
transcendent in human beings; thus the spirit overcomes the slavery of the 
material body. With this transit a transformation does not occur, but a 
survival of the ideal or incorporeal aspect does. Death affects only the 
body. This is a dualist-interactionist conception of the mind-body 
relationship. It is also a dualist anthropology. In contrast to Plato, 
Aristotle develops a unitary concept of great transcendence. 
Aristotle 
According to Aristotle l3 his predecessors characterized the soul by 
three attributes: movement, sensation and incorporality.14 According to 
these concepts movement is one of the differential properties between 
living and inanimate things. This includes not only movement in its 
external manifestations but also other immanent transformations such as 
growth, changes in shape, etc. A physiological sense is implicit in 
Aristotelian philosophy based on the form-matter relationship. The 
platonic simile of the soul as the pilot of the body received in Aristotle a 
meaning both biological and metaphysical: the soul is the unifying 
principle of the organism and also the origin of consciousness. The 
concept of "substantial form" refers to the vital principle expressed in the 
organization of matter as an organism or functional unit. This organization 
implies a relational disposition among the different parts that constitute a 
unity and a totality, in a way that cannot be reduced to the mere sum of the 
components. 
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Life has a triple nature: plants obtain nutrients, they grow and 
reproduce themselves; animals feel and move; human beings reason, 
remember, know about their existence and have knowledge of their death. 
Human beings represent a synthesis of three aspects: the vegetative soul, 
the sensitive soul and the intellectual soul. Aristotle introduced the terms 
psychic, psychology, psychophysics and psychosomatic.1 5 
He wrote, "I think the soul and the body react one on the other by 
sympathy. A change in the psychic state produces a change in the form of 
the body and, inversely, a change in the form of the body produces a 
change in the state of the soul.,,16 
PopperlO has commented that Aristotle's essences or irrational souls 
are anticipations of the modem theory of the genes: as the DNA they plan 
the actions of the organism and guide it towards its "telos", towards its 
perfection. In a nutshell, his system considers the human being as a unity, 
and the soul is not only the conscious aspect but also the vital integrating 
principle. 
Descartes 
Gilbert Ryle l7 coined the expression "the ghost in the machine". It 
summarizes Descartes' mechanist dualism. 18 The human body is 
considered as an automat capable, however, of voluntary movements. The 
French thinker considered extension as the essence of corporeality or 
materiality. In this, his concept was somehow similar to Aristotelian theory 
of prime matter or Plato's concepts about space. Following an ancient 
tradition he also sustained the theory that the mind is incorporeal. In 
assuming that extension is the essence of materiality, he was obliged to 
postulate that the incorporeal substance, the soul, was inextensive, "a 
substance which total essence or nature is not but to think, and which in 
order to be, does not need any place and does not depend on any material 
thing.,,19 Following this line of thought, if interrelations and all causation 
in the physical world occur through pressures or impulsions, the mind-body 
interaction is only possible in a similar way. He was an interactionist-
dualist who developed, on this premise, a mechanist theory of the mind-
body interrelation. 10 
In Descartes the interrelation of the inextensive soul with the body 
occurs, however, through an extensive structure: the pineal gland. To 
modem neo-Cartesians this interaction can occur through different portions 
of the brain. Penfield20 considered the "centroencephalon" as the key 
structure for this interaction. According to Ecc\es21 it is the zone of 
language in the "dominant" hemisphere. According to Penfield's concept, 
disanimation of the body would require the destruction of most of the brain. 
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Eccles' theory would require destruction of a very restrictive area of the 
brain hemispheres. 
The concept of the soul as a vaporous entity, shade or specter and its 
entification or reification lead to undervaluing or disregarding the 
biological substratum. It also implies that the soul is a separable entity in a 
relation of juxtaposition with the body. Just to mention an example, a 
practical consequence of this dualist and mechanistic view is the 
requirement that every part of the organism must die before death can be 
certain, or an arbitrary selection of which portion determines the link 
between the two separable aspects.22 
Descartes' mechanistic world and his problematic interactions dualism 
according to which the body-mind relation occurs as an extrinsic 
juxtaposition, create the possibility for a dissociation between the moment 
when the "spirit" abandons the "machine" and the destruction or cessation 
of functioning of the machine itself. In other words, disanimation of the 
body becomes a speculative problem beyond the field of medicine?2 This 
situation leads to a separation between the biological basis of death and its 
philosophical and theological significance. Therefore, according to this 
position, the presence or absence of the soul in the body is irrelevant from 
the physiological point of view. Hence, the philosophical origin of certain 
positions,23,24 according to which it is possible to separate the concepts of 
personhood and death from the mere biological functioning of the 
organism, can be understood. 
III. The Theological Perspective 
Two central problems must be coherently and comprehensively 
articulated by theology: the anthropological issue of the deep identity of 
man; and the problem of the meaning and truth of human existence. 
The human being is the summit of the creation, he gathers in himself 
the unity of the material and the spiritual aspects.25 According to Thomas 
Aquinas, the human person is "the horizon of creation, where the heavens 
and the earth are united; as a link between time and eternity; as a synthesis 
of the creation.,,26 
It has also been expressed this way: "in the unity of body and soul, the 
man, because of his bodily condition, is a synthesis of the material 
universe.,,27 The situation of the human beings in the universe is not a mere 
accident but it is part of their essential reality.28 "The Lord God formed the 
man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of 
life, and the man became a living being" (Gn. 2:7). This passage from the 
book of Genesis expresses the constitution of man by two co-principles 
(matter and spirit), as well as his essential unity with the rest of creation. 
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Considered from a merely biological point of view, he lacks a specifically 
super-specialized functional constitution. However, he creates a specific 
human cultural environment and his technological enterprise becomes a 
powerful tool. He not only transcends the physical world but he can also 
open himself to a transcendent and infinite personal reality. 
According to his relational essence - in the image of God - man can 
transcend biological and sociological conditioning in a search that has its 
natural horizon in God himself.8,29 He has been called to be the steward of 
the creation, a collaborator with God. The man, a finite being, is loved by 
God in himself and as whole, and he is endowed with a capacity for 
freedom and spontaneity.8,29 In his search he always makes new 
synthesis.28 The unity of the human person is theologically axiomatic. On 
the basis of this unity the possibility exists for him to find a realization in 
the created world, in relationship with the Creator and with his fellow 
human beings. But what is the real foundation of this unity? The 
theological foundation cannot be found but in Christology: "only Christ 
reveals man to man himself...,,27 Man recognizes in Christ his 
anthropological status, his freedom , his dignity and his supernatural 
destiny. 
The Semitic anthropology 
Looking into the Judeo-Christian tradition it is possible to find an 
understanding of the human being coherent with the knowledge provided 
by science today. To modern eyes, the picture of man presented in 
Scripture appears impressively realistic . It catches both the complexity and 
plurality of his dimensions while affirming at the same time the unity of the 
human person.7-9 It opens the door to a deeper understanding of the reality 
of man: both from an empirical point of view and from the perspective of 
his metaphysical structure.7-9 Man's intimate unity is essential to his 
quality of being "capax Dei" which makes him destined to enter, as a 
whole, into an interpersonal communion with God. 
Let us briefly review the anthropological terms in the Bible. They 
refer to the totality of the human being as a unity, described from different 
points of view. Four terms are used in Scripture: basar, nefesh, ruah and 
feb (these terms have been translated into the Greek as follows: sarx, 
psuche, pneuma, kardia, and into the Latin as follows : caro, anima, 
. • 7-9 SpirituS, cor or mens. 
Basar: The flesh-man (Greek: sarx) emphasizes the relation of man with 
the material world, his mortality. Man is reduced to his earthly empirical 
existence. Man does not have a body, he is a body. The biological man 
exposed to suffering and disease, temptation and sin. The term also refers 
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to man inasmuch as he lives only in a self-centered dimension without 
opening to the other and to God. This term also marks the bodily condition 
of man, the body-man (Greek: soma),7-9 the man as a whole, in his relations 
with the others; it can frequently be translated as "I". It is close to the 
meaning of our concept of personality. 
Nefesh: The soul-man (Greek: psuche)7-9 makes reference to the conscious 
identity: "I", the entire man as a human being. Man does not have life, he 
is life. It also captures man ' s involvement in history, his psycho-social 
dimension and his responsibility in this sphere. 
Ruah: The spirit-man (Greek: pneuma)7-9 denotes his difference with the 
material world, his affinity toward God, his capacity to enter a deep 
communion with the deepest aspects of reality, and with the Creator. It is 
the "soul-body-man" living in a new dimension . 
Leb: this term refers to the synthesis of emotion and reason as well as to the 
physical and spiritual aspects and the interpenetration of these constituent 
dimensions. 7-9 
Frequently the word soul is interchangeable for life in the English 
translations (for example, Mark 8:36, Luke 12:20, etc.). The Hebrew 
anthropologist understands the human being as a uni-totality. He is, "as a 
whole" body, soul, spirit; however, this does not mean unicity or 
uniformity. Two existential options are presented to him: as "flesh-man" 
he is closed to the neighbor and to God; conversely, as a "spirit-man" he is 
open to God who concedes him fullness and immortality.8 
The central events in the Christian faith 
Christ's death and resurrection, doubtless the central events in the 
Christian faith , are articulated in terms of the Semitic anthropology. The 
redemption and the expression of the person "as a whole" through the 
resurrection constituted the anthropological novelty and the center of the 
Christian message, not the immortality of the soul according to the platonic 
philosophy,8,29 which ignores the dignity of the body. Conversely, the 
preaching of the apostles recognizes the body as "the temple of the Spirit" 
(I Co. 3: 16). For example, the classic definition of death as no more than 
the separation of the soul from the body, following the platonic influence, 
recognizes a spiritual and transcendent dimension in the human being, but 
it does not capture the richness revealed in the resurrection; it is 
anthropologically incomplete. It implies that death affects only the body 
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while the soul remains intact. With this, man would abandon one essential 
aspect of his anthropological status: his corporeality. 
Christ's resurrection indicates that death affects the totality of man 
and not only his "body. ,,8,29 The concept of the body must be reconsidered 
as a constituent and essential part of the soul. Thus, the center of the 
Christian preaching is not in just one aspect of the human person; it 
encompasses the totality. The final and full expression of the human 
redemption does not imply the abandonment of the body but its complete 
assumption and liberation in God and for God.8 The apostle Paul talks 
about a "spiritual body", which is only apparently contradictory. The 
contradiction exists between spirit and "flesh" but not between spirit and 
body. The natural body can be transformed into a glorified or pneumatic 
body (I Cor. 15). 
The person reaches his goal when he becomes full of the divine 
reality and overcomes all his alienations. It is the definite entrance of man 
in his fullness into the kingdom of God. This is what is implicit - after a 
closer scrutiny - in the word soul when it is used to note the dynamic 
principle in the human being that makes them move towards an insatiable 
search for the infinite. Finally, with death, all that is essential and 
transcendent may crystallize.8 According to this spiritual dimension, 
human beings can transcend the domain of what is merely physical to reach 
a new mansion, a transfigured body. Moreover, the Christian message 
introduces a more encompassing dimension . The resurrection does not 
concern only man in his more nuclear aspect, but with the consummation of 
the world the whole creation will be redeemed, and his country, the 
"cosmos", will be transformed "so that God may be all in all" (I Co. 
15:28). The unity of man with the universe will be consummated (Ro 8: 
21). 
The essential aspects of the Judeo-Christian tradition have been 
considered, as well as the central events of the Christian faith. They 
provide the key to interpret Pope Pius XII words in his "Replies to Some 
Important Questions Concerning Reanimation,,30 in 1957, establishing that 
"it was the province of physicians, and particularly of the anesthetist, to 
give a clear and accurate defin it ion of ' death ' and of the ' moment of death ' 
when a patient passed away while unconscious." He conceived a 
disintegration as equivalent to the death of the person "even if certain 
organs continue to function ." These statements presuppose the essential 
unity of the human person. They indicate that loss of personhood and 
death are coincident and inseparable. 
It is important now to analyze how the above-considered tradition is 
articulated with the theological and anthropological principle of the unity 
of the human person in Thomas Aquinas ' conception. Finally, it will 
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become evident how these aspects are coherently interrelated with a new 
rationale based on current biomedical knowledge. 
IV. The Thomist Tradition 
Thomas Aquinas re-approached and transformed the categories of the 
Aristotelian philosophy, the relationship between matter and form known 
as Hylemorphism (Greek "hyle" and "morphe" form). He developed a 
concept that defines the plural unity of the human person. He resolved the 
arduous problem of a relation that could save on one side the distinction of 
the components and on the other the unity of man's personal being.31 This 
conception became part of patrimony of the Christian faith as it is in 
consonance with the Biblical model. 
Thomas Aquinas' anthropology has two fundamental aspects: First, 
"The doctrine of the human nature as a unity of 'soul and body' which 
explains the intelligibility of the human being and his history". The second 
aspect is "the doctrine of the person which in a special mode orients us 
from the ethical point of view and in relation to the way of the person in the 
plane of the creation and of the Christian salvation.,,31 These two aspects 
have axiologic value. 
Aquinas retook and elaborated Boecio's formula. The person is 
"individua substancia rational is natura" . Let us summarize it.32 
Substantiality indicates the ontological substratum of the person. The 
person as a whole is greater than the mere sum of any of the constitutive 
aspects. The identity of the person subsists as superior to the expressions 
of any particular act. The individuality points out the distinction of every 
man as a unique and irrepeatable living being, the biological and corporal 
status. Rationality is an essential attribute of man. It is not dependent on 
the actual capacity of expression in a certain moment or circumstance. The 
status of personhood is related to the specific constitution of the human 
individual. It is not determined by the acts of the person. 
Contribution of Thomism to a unitary doctrine of the human person 
The Thomist conception articulates both the biological and spiritual 
dimension of the human being. The main concepts can be summarized as 
follows: 
(a) The human person is a unity of differentiated dimensions. The soul is 
the "substantial form of the body". It is the source of self-consciousness as 
well as the vital principle, which unifies the body. 
(b) The head is the critical portion that determines the life and unity of the 
human body.33 
(c) Substantial changes occur as instant transitions. 
February, 2001 79 
The soul as the "substantial form of the body" 
According to the Aristotelian tradition, man is a synthesis of three 
aspects: the vegetative life, the sensitive soul, and the intellectual soul.34 
Thomas Aquinas developed a unitary theory. He clarified the fact that 
though there are three conceptually differentiable levels, there is only one 
soul and not three. The unity and totality of the body is greater than the 
sum of its components. The ontological level pertinent to the human 
person includes the convergence of these aspects. The man is not 
conformed by the sum of two different essences, that is, soul and body. 
Spirit and matter are, more precisely, the two co-principles that constitute 
man as a unity and a totality. The soul is the "substantial form of the 
body". The body is realization and expression of the spirit. 
Shewmon33 has noted the affinity between current biological concepts 
and the Aristotelian-Thomist conception of the soul as "substantial form" 
of the body. In living organisms a constant and dynamic exchange of 
atoms and molecules occurs, which includes all the tissues and organs of 
the organism. It encompasses even the more seemingly static components 
as the bones and the nervous tissue. After a certain time, the original atoms 
and molecules are replaced by different ones. However, the organism 
remains the same due to a conservation of relations at the atomic, 
molecular and biological levels. This implies a persistence of the form of 
the body throughout time. This is an essential or "substantial" aspect. 
Shewmon has noted the similarity of the Aristotelian-Thomist concepts 
with certain modem analysis of the vital processes. This author quotes 
Varela35 who has developed the concept of "autopoiesis" or "autopoietic 
mechanism" to describe the essence of living organisms. According to 
Varela, "an autopoietic machine continuously generates and specifies its 
own organization throughout its operation as a system of production of its 
own components, and it does this in an endless exchange of components 
under conditions of continuous perturbations and compensations of the 
perturbations. Therefore, an autopoietic machine is a homeostatic system 
(or rather a relation-static system) that has its own organization (defining 
networks of relations) as the fundamental invariant". From a biological 
point of view, this description, along with the organizational principle it 
implies, has a great similarity with the Aristotelian-Thomist concept of 
"substantial form of the body". 
The head as the critical portion which determines the life and unity of 
the human person. 
Thomas Aquinas considered the head as the critical portion in the 
human body.33 According to him, it is "the seat of consciousness," but at 
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the same time, "no other external portion is related to the integrity of the 
organism in the same way as the head. ,,37 Thus, the essence of the body as 
animated matter, the body-soul unity, ceases with the absence of 
respiration, "not because this is the means of union but because of the 
remotion of that disposition in virtue of which the body is conditioned by 
this union.,,38 Therefore, the spiritual faculties in the human beings include 
the intellect and the will and, though they are essentially immaterial, they 
require an appropriate functioning of the brain. 
Substantial changes occur as instant transitions. 
According to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, things have their 
existence in virtue of two principles: matter as pure potentiality and 
substantial form, which specifies the substance or essence of the object, 
phenomenon or entity. The accidents or properties characterize the object 
in its condition as such. Substantial changes occur as a critical series of 
accidental changes. They are instantaneous while accidental changes are 
continuous. These concepts are relevant to different problems including 
the definition of death.33 It makes intelligible the theological concept of 
death as an instant transition and the fact that the soul encompasses the 
whole body, and yet, the destruction of only one essential part (the brain) 
can lead to the loss of the substantial form of the body as an instantaneous 
change. It can be considered a substantial change because it means 
dissolution of the essential attributes of the human person: substantiality, 
individuality, and rationality. It is coincident with the understanding of 
death as an event or transition between the process of dying and the process 
of disintegration.38,39 This is sustained on neurological, legal, social and 
religious grounds. 1-5, 22, 38-40 
The Thomist conception harbors the mystery of man as a biological, 
psychological and spiritual being. His anthropology "always unites very 
closely the consideration of nature and the person, so that nature founds the 
objective values of the person, and the person confers a concrete meaning 
to the universal values of nature. ,,31 
V. The Unity of the Person: the Biomedical Basis 
Errors and oversimplifications have not been infrequent concerning 
this issue. Let us summarize them: 1-5 
(a) The univocal treatment of differentiated hierarchical levels in the 
human organism. 
(b) The inadequate specification of what function or set of functions 
determines the criticality of the brain. 
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(c) Exclusively attributing all content of consciousness to the cerebral 
neocortex. 
(d) Disregarding the encephalization process of arousal in human beings as 
one of the aspects of consciousness, as well as the richness of its 
components and its contribution to the content of consciousness, and hence 
the philosophical and biomedical meaning of this fact. 
(e) Considering autonomic integration as brain stem-centered, contrary to 
current neuro-physiological knowledge, which shows autonomic 
integration as related to hierarchically higher limbic structures. 
(f) As a consequence of (c) and (e), a dichotomy: consciousness (cerebral 
neocortex)/autonomic integration (brain stem). 
(g) Disregarding the integration "as a whole" of these functions. 
(h) Finally, as a result of the above, the failure to recognize and make 
explicit a fundamental fact: the essential unity of the human person. 
Considering fundamental biomedical knowledge the author has 
proposed the concept of a system that, from a biological point of view, 
could be justly considered as "the system of the mind-body unity" 
(SMBU).1-5 It captures the idea that the generation of consciousness is 
inseparable from the rest of the integrative functions that determine the 
capacity of the organism to function "as a whole" . The above essential and 
irreplaceable system can be described with a necessary and sufficient level 
of resolution. It is composed of the following subsystems: 
I) Structures from the ascending reticular activation (sub )system: 
nonspecific populations of neurons located in the tegmentum of the rostral 
pons and midbrain, the intralaminal and reticularis nuclei of the thalamus 
and the posterior hypothalamus. 
2) Limbic structures: the hypothalamus, the basal forebrain, the amygdala, 
the hyppocampal complex, the cingulum, the septal area, the nucleus 
basalis of Meynert and reticularis nuclei in the midbrain and rostral pons. 
Also the pedunculopontine nucleus, the rostral raphe nuclei, the 
periaqueductal gray and the nucleus locus ceruleus. 
3) The cerebral cortex with the thalamus, and basal ganglia. 
This system provides the capacity for the following functions: 
(I) The generation of consciousness; 
(2) Integration and control of the communication systems of the organism 
(nervous, hormonal, immune); 
(3) Processing, integration and regulation of the afferent flow from, and the 
efferent responses to, the whole organism; 
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(4) Integration and control of the mechanisms that maintain homeostasis in 
the internal environment; 
(5) Behavioral and adaptive interactions with the outer world; 
(6) The most intimate relation between physiological processes and mental 
states; 
(7) The integration "as a whole" of each one of the foregoing functions. 
A key question that needs to be addressed is whether or not the 
interrelation and integration "as a whole" offunctions from (1) to (6) could 
be better understood in itself as constituting a function higher than, and 
irreducible to, either any of the specific (sub )functions of the system or to 
the mere sum of them. Is the interrelation between the processes that 
generate these functions the origin of a qualitatively higher functional level 
that might constitute the most valid concept to consider the brain as being 
above any other organ or system of organs in the organism? Are these 
various brain functions simply integrated through their mutual interaction? 
Or, are they so closely integrated and mutually enriched in the living brain 
that, as a whole, they could be better understood as a global "metafunction" 
of the 5MBU? 
Modern neuroscience depicts the functions of the brain in a 
fragmentary way.41 An explanation as to how all the highly specialized and 
apparently fragmentary work of the brain is put together constitutes the 
central problem of neurocognitive science. This is known as the binding 
problem. Specialists concc<de that the solution to this problem may still be 
far.41. 42 However, this is only a first level of the problem related to 
consciousness. In a second level, the way the brain integrates and control 
"as a whole" its different general functions would have to be approached. 
The state of the art in this area should not preclude an approach based on 
more general inferences. The more precise knowledge about the brain 
achieved during the last few decades is revealing, in general, concerning 
the "what" and "where," even when the "how" may represent a much more 
complex challenge. An inescapable picture that becomes patent, when the 
brain is considered in a more global perspective, is the practically complete 
anatomical and physiological correspondence among its different general 
functions (see above). 
The example that follows indicates the need of keeping sight of the 
global perspective. Observations that indicate the impressive capacity of 
the brain to integrate and control its function should not be overlooked. It 
has been shown that humans can consciously access a great range of brain 
functions. One way of achieving this is through conscious sensory 
feedback.43. 43 Conscious feedback seems to create spectacular access to 
skeletal muscle and to autonomic musculature. Indeed this pattern also 
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extends to conditioned immune responses.45.46 Biofeedback control of 
single neurons and populations of neurons is well established. It seems 
that, any neuron or population of neurons can come under rapid, precise, 
voluntary control when immediate conscious sensory feedback is provided. 
To gain control over a single spinal motor unit its electrical activity is 
monitored, amplified and played back over headphones; in such a short 
period as 30 minutes subjects have been able to play drum rolls using a 
single motor unit isolated from adjacent units. Similarly, to gain control 
over alpha waves in occipital cortex a tone is sounded when the rhythm is 
detected in the EEG, and subjects can learn to increase the amount of alpha 
at will after a short period of time. Conscious sensory feedback appears to 
be a necessary condition for the establishment of biofeedback control. 
This is only one expression of the anatomical and functional 
correspondence among the different global functions of the brain. This is 
a spectacular capacity of control which reflects the existence of the finest 
relation between the system "as a whole" and each one of its most basic 
components. There does not seem to exist a convincing explanation of 
these observations except that of a powerful functional integration with a 
global reach. This knowledge is consistent with what researchers as 
Damasio have stated, in the sense that because a theory of consciousness 
must show how we acquire a sense of self, it necessarily must consider not 
only the brain but also the entire body.41 
Further investigation is required to substantiate and develop the above 
proposed concept. However, at the very least, it is closer to the anatomical 
and physiological reality of the living brain than the dichotomy 
cortex=conciousness / brain stem=autonomic integration. It may provide 
ground for a precise and explicit rationale concerning the unity of the 
human person. It is relevant to the most fundamental bioethical issues 
including the formulation of death . It could be the best rationale to 
characterize the brain as the essential and highest hierarchical level of 
organization in the human organism. It would provide a clearer 
understanding concerning the irreplaceability and criticality of the brain 
and the ontological level pertinent to the definition of death. This concept 
would provide a coherent explanation as to why the brain is the privileged 
organ in which the essential "functional synthesis" of the living human 
organism occurs. The destruction of the system with the capacity to 
generate its critical "metafunction" would inherently mean the loss of the 
essential quality of the organism as a "uni-totality" . 
The rationale considered above is relevant to other ethical problems 
that include the concept of personhood and the problem of defining 
health.47 This rationale would explicitly support the inseparability of both 
the loss of personhood and the death of the organism. It would also 
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provide a suitable conceptual frame to approach and elaborate a number of 
fundamental issues such as the problems of identity and individuality, the 
principle of totality, etc. All these aspects still require further neurological 
and bioethical investigation. 
Thus, this rationale may provide a biomedical foundation to a unitary 
concept of the person, which is questioned today by certain positions. This 
concept is founded on neurological knowledge and belongs to the field of 
biomedicine. At the same time, it remains open and suggestive for those of 
us who believe in a transcendent substantiality of the human person, a 
metaphysical dimension essentially articulated with the intrinsic biological 
unity of the human organism. 
The biologicality of the cerebral components, its organicity, is not an 
accidental aspect, which could be totally replaced by some sort of artificial 
intelligence device at some point in the future .33 The constant metabolic 
activity of the brain, the endless exchange of molecules, the constant 
remodeling of the cellular structures, the harmonic functioning of the 
systems of neurotransmiters, the fascinating complexity of the cerebral 
modules, along with the horizontal and vertical organization of the brain, 
and its possibility of concerted functioning and adaptive automodification, 
all this, constitutes an essential aspect of the capacity of the brain for its 
"intelligent" integration and control of the organism, as well as the 
expression of the intellectual faculties . This incredible capacity is 
genetically codified from the very beginning. There is an immanent 
dynamism and potentiality along the continuum of human life, from intra-
uterus life to adulthood and senescence. 
VI. Loss of Personhood is Coincident With 
and Inseparable From the Moment of Death 
The rationale considered herein provides a suitable conceptual frame 
to approach and elaborate a number of fundamental issues such as the 
problems of identity and individuality, the principle of totality ("the whole" 
is greater than the extrinsic sum of the parts or the acts), etc. This concept 
allows greater precision in approaching the problem of the definition and 
determination of death. It separates death from a number of "limit-
syndromes" like the "vegetative" states, severe states of dementia, severe 
encephalopathies, and primary brain stem death. lo5 It is not possible to 
dissociate personhood either from consciousness or from the biological 
capacity of the organism to function as a unity and a totality, as both 
aspects have a common neurological basis. It is evident the coincidence of 
the death of the individual - at the same time human being and person -
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with the death of the organism. Biomedical knowledge confirms what is 
theologically axiomatic: the unity of the human person. 
VII. Conclusion 
A concept of personhood based on the intrinsic biological unity of 
human beings is not of little importance to understanding human life and 
death, as well as a number of fundamental biomedical problems. A 
tradition of philosophic and theological thought meets the anthropological 
principle of personhood as a unity of differentiated dimensions. This unity 
does not imply either uniformity or unicity. The rationality considered 
herein supports the above-mentioned anthropological principle from a 
biomedical perspective. It provides a synthesis, which constitutes an 
adequate conceptual frame to re-approach a number of issues currently 
treated - by certain trends - in a reductionist way. The concept of a 
critical metafunction in the human brain is fundamental if one is to 
understand the unity of the human person, which has axiological value to 
elaborate a number of issues in the interface between biomedicine and 
theology. This concept can be articulated with a historical tradition of 
thought in western civilization. 
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